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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Dan Li 
 
Master of Science 
 
Department of Computer and Information Science 
 
December 2019 
 
Title: Detecting Malicious Usage of Online Social Network Application Programming 
Interfaces from Network Flows 
 
While online social networks (OSNs) provide application programming interfaces 
(APIs) to enable the development of OSN applications, some of these applications, 
unfortunately, can be malicious. They can be running on the devices for OSN users 
throughout the Internet, causing security, privacy, and liability concerns to the network 
service providers of these OSN users. 
In this thesis, we study how a network service provider may inspect its network 
traffic to detect network flows from malicious API-based OSN applications. In particular, 
we devise a deep learning based methodology to detect network flows generated by 
malicious API-based OSN applications. We implement this methodology on a testbed, 
and show that our solution is effective and can accurately label 97.6% network flows 
from the malicious OSN applications, with only 1.6% false positives. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Online social networks (OSN) have become extremely popular with an ever-
growing user base. At the time of writing this master thesis, Facebook, Twitter, and 
WeChat each has 2.2 billion, 0.4 billion, and 0.5 billion users, respectively. In particular, 
in order to further enrich and improve the user experience, OSNs have provided public 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to enable the development of OSN 
applications that can access OSN data and functions. However, the provision of these 
APIs can cause severe security concerns.  
Whereas these public APIs make it easy and convenient for OSN applications to 
provide various legitimate OSN services, such as querying an OSN user’s profile 
information and friend lists, retweeting certain tweets, or making automated comments, 
they may also be abused or misused by malicious OSN applications. They can be running 
on the devices for OSN users throughout the Internet, causing security, privacy, and 
liability concerns to the network service providers of these OSN users. Very often, by 
using OSN APIs, a malicious OSN application may control bot accounts to post or reply 
with spam or fraudulent information, run a crawler to collect private and sensitive OSN 
user data, or act as a third-party application to obtain access to accounts of OSN users, 
followed by collecting the profiles of these users and even their friends. In a widely 
known case, Facebook was reported to leak data of up to 87 million users through a third-
part psychology quiz application (NC Matthew, 2018).  
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While abusing OSN APIs, these malicious OSN applications particularly cause 
concerns to network service providers (NSPs) for OSN users. It could be an Internet 
service provider (ISP), an enterprise or campus network. If a malicious OSN application 
is running inside a network, it can imply that one or multiple machines in the network are 
compromised, the application can subvert the privacy of OSN users, and the network may 
have to be liable for the security and privacy violations.  
However, an NSP is not at the same position as an OSN provider to deal with 
malicious OSN applications. An OSN provider can try to monitor API calls, obtain full 
knowledge of user profiles and posts, as well as access the entire OSN graph, in order to 
detect OSN spam accounts (X Zheng, 2015), (F Benevenuto, 2010), (A Almaatouq, 
2016), (M Fazi, 2018), limit large-scale crawling activities (M Mondal. 2012), detect 
malicious third-party OSN applications (SH Ahmadinejad, 2013), and so on. On the other 
hand, an NSP only has limited knowledge of OSN data (such as user posts, profiles, 
social behaviors, OSN graphs). It can only access the traffic across its network, thus not 
able to leverage the aforementioned existing work toward detecting malicious OSN 
applications.  
We therefore study how an NSP may monitor its traffic to detect traffic flows 
from malicious OSN applications. We make the following contributions:  
1) We define a problem of detecting flows from malicious API-based OSN 
applications, whereas the flow data used do not include traffic payload. In another 
word, the problem assumes no knowledge of OSN topologies or specific user 
profiles and data.  
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2) We propose a solution to detect flows from malicious API-based OSN 
applications. First, we train a deep learning model for malicious OSN flow 
detection based on three types of OSN flows: flows from malicious API-based 
OSN applications, flows from benign API- based OSN applications, and flows 
from human user operations on the OSN. For each machine running inside an 
NSP, we extract, aggregate, normalize and visualize flows generated between the 
machine and an OSN, then apply our trained model to determine whether the 
normalized flows are generated by a malicious OSN application running on a 
machine inside the NSP. 
3) We implement our proposed solution on a testbed, where we simulate and 
collect flows for various malicious OSN applications, benign OSN applications, 
and human user operations. The trained deep learning model is able to detect 
flows generated by malicious OSN applications with high accuracy and low false 
positive. In particular, the trained model is able to label flows from three real- 
world benign OSN applications and three real-world malicious OSN applications 
with high accuracy. Our research demonstrates that it is feasible to detect flows 
from malicious API-based applications on OSNs. What’s more, our proposed 
solution can apply to any other social networks. e.g. Facebook, Twitter.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. After Chapter II about related work, 
we first overview the problem and our solution in Chapter III, followed by a formal 
description of the problem in Chapter IV. We then generate flows on a test bed in 
Chapter V to implement our solution, describe our detailed solution in Chapter VI, 
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evaluate the performance of our solution in Chapter VII, discuss our work in Chapter VII, 
conclude our work in Chapter IX, and introduce our future work in Chapter X. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
While APIs released by OSNs are supposed to work for third-party developers to 
access OSN services, researchers have shown they can be easily misused by crawlers to 
crawl OSN data or by spammers to spread fraud or spam content ((AH Wang, 2010), (A 
Saroop, 2011) and (CM Zhang, 2011)). The work in (AH Wang, 2010) crawled a large 
amount of sensitive OSN data by using OSN APIs, and research in (A Saroop, 2011) 
even designed an API-based crawler that attackers can use to crawl a large amount of 
Twitter network structural information. At the same time, spam accounts controlled by 
malicious API applications are common on OSNs; as the research in (CM Zhang, 2011) 
points out that, many automated spam accounts on OSNs prefer to use API rather than a 
web browser to spread fraud or spam content.  
There are certain proposed methods that detect malicious automated spam 
accounts on OSNs, including recent work in (X Zheng, 2015), (F Benevenuto, 2010), (A 
Almaatouq, 2016), and (M Fazi, 2018). Basically, they all analyze the post content, user 
profiles, or social behaviors of spam accounts and rely on these features to detect spam 
accounts. However, a network service provider that usually only collect network flow 
data can hardly have access to such features, thus not able to employ such a method to 
detect OSN spam accounts inside their network.  
Methods are also proposed to prevent crawling activities on OSNs. Research in (J 
Herrera-Joancomartí, 2011) and (M Mondal, 2012) proposed countermeasures to prevent 
attackers from crawling sensitive OSN user data. Research in (J Herrera-Joancomartí, 
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2011) proposes an “Online Social Honey net” concept by deploying a set of users on 
network to attract and defend OSN crawler attackers, but it only proves the feasibility of 
using this concept to prevent crawlers, not about deploying it in the real world. Research 
in (M Mondal, 2012) proposes a Genie system which is deployed at OSN providers to 
thwart crawlers by detecting their different browsing patterns. This work analyzes user 
traces of visiting their friends and non-friends, which is sensitive and, again, not 
accessible in network flow data, so their methodology is not usable by a network service 
provider to detect malicious OSN activities.  
On the other hand, many methods have been proposed to analyze flow data to 
detect network attacks or anomalies. Research in (R Singh, 2012) uses campus traffic 
flows to detect anomaly broadcast traffic, while (J. François, 2011) extends the popular 
PageRank algorithm to detect botnet traffic. The work (A King, 2009) and (P Barfor, 
2001) both detect network traffic flow anomalies by analyzing flow-level anomaly 
features. And research in (ZQ Wang, 2008), (H Rick, 2013), and (VDS Daniël, 2015) 
also proposes several real-time intrusion detection systems based on monitoring network 
flow traffic. These papers all follow a similar idea by detecting a specific attack based on 
the flow- level features of the attack. However, the specific attack features explored in 
these existing methods are different from the features of OSN attacks, making their 
feature-based detection methods basically ineffective in detecting OSN attacks.  
In obtaining a better understanding how users use or interact with online social 
networks, research in (B Fabrício, 2012), (W Watcharee, 2012), (M Zoltán, 2011), (S 
Fabian, 2009) investigated how to use traffic analysis methods to study social networks. 
However, these methods analyze network traffic that includes packet payload in general, 
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which is different from our work that uses the network flow data that only carry 
aggregated packet header information.  
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CHAPTER III 
OVERVIEW 
 
The goal of this project is to detect flows from malicious API-based applications 
on OSNs. We assume that traffic flows of human OSN behaviors and benign API-based 
application behaviors share some normal flow-level features, while traffic flows of 
malicious API-based applications have some malicious flow-level features. We propose a 
solution to detect flows generated by malicious API-based applications. Our solution first 
aggregates flow for the above three category flows separately, normalizes each of the 
aggregated flows, then uses normalized flows as the input to train a deep learning model. 
The trained deep learning model can learn features effectively from high-dimensional 
network flows, and can label flows from malicious API-based applications. We 
implemented this solution on a test bed.  
Since there is no available dataset providing flow data generated by malicious 
API-based applications and other benign OSN flows, we use emulation to generate those 
flows. We deploy a small social network, WordPress, as a test bed where users can 
browse and reply to each other’s posts. We then collect flows for human OSN behaviors, 
benign API- based applications, and malicious API-based applications on this small 
social network. We performed these three behaviors on a client which is installed with 
flow generation software and flow collection software. In this way, when we simulate 
three behaviors on this client, their corresponding flows will be collected on the client 
side by flow collection software. 
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To simulate a large amount of various human OSN behaviors, we write scripts to 
emulate various possible human behaviors on a social network website. These operations 
include login, post, comment, browsing behaviors, and so on. Human behaviors on social 
networks are driven by a series of click events. We use scripts to emulate those click 
events instead, and flows generated by script-controlled click events should be the same 
as flows generated by human-controlled click events. For benign API-based applications, 
OSN APIs should only be a tool used by human beings. Such tools will post content on 
social networks for human beings whenever people want to. Therefore, those benign API-
based applications’ behavior time points should follow human post/comment/like timing 
patterns on OSN. Human behavior patterns can be modeled as different Poisson 
processes (CM Zhang, 2011), so benign API-based application behavior time points can 
also be modeled as different Poisson processes. We simulate various benign API- based 
application behavior time points as different Poisson processes by changing Poisson 
distribution parameters. At each behavior time point, the benign OSN application will 
post some useful content. For malicious API-based applications, we write five known 
malicious application scripts, and their behavior time points are decided by these five 
known malicious API-based applications’ behavioral patterns (CM Zhang, 2011). Each 
application posts spam or malicious posts, comments following one of five known 
malicious timing patterns. We model each malicious API-based application behavioral 
timing pattern as a combination of different probability distributions, and simulate each 
malicious pattern by changing all related parameters. To collect flow data generated by 
benign or malicious API-based applications and human OSN behaviors, we collect 
corresponding flows when we simulate those three behaviors on the client side.  
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To save time generating data for human OSN behaviors, benign and malicious 
API-based applications, we synthesize flows for each of those three behaviors. When 
people or applications are active and perform various operations on OSNs, there are some 
flows generated. Otherwise, no flows are generated. To synthesize flows generated in a 
long period of time, we only need to combine flows generated when people or 
applications are active on OSN together. First, we collect flows when applications or 
people are active on OSNs, then combine those flows together with proper intervals. 
Interval length indicates how long people or applications wait between two active 
sessions. In this way, we can synthesize flows generated in a long period of time for 
benign and malicious API-based applications, and human OSN behaviors.  
We’ve generated flows for the above three behaviors. After that, we extracted all 
flows generated by the communication between the client and our small social network 
by extracting flows whose source IPs or destination IPs belong to our deployed OSN 
server. We’ve found that even a very single user operation behavior, such as a click 
behavior, can generate several flows, so a single flow data carries very little information 
about how users behave on an OSN. Therefore, we aggregate flows that occurred in a 
pre-defined time window together, and those aggregated flows can carry more 
information about how a user behaves in the pre-defined time window. For each 
aggregated flow group, we transformed it into an image which carries the main 
information of the aggregated flow group. Those transformed images act as the input to 
train the deep learning model, which can automatically find potential flow-level features 
for human OSN behaviors, benign and malicious API-based applications. After the model 
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is well-trained, it is able to detect these flows generated by malicious API-based 
applications with high accuracy, precision and recall scores.  
The methodology described above enables NSPs to obtain a deep learning model 
with very good performance in detecting flows generated by malicious API-based 
applications. We built a small social network through the WordPress blog system as a 
testbed, and implemented our proposed solution to detect flows from malicious API-
based applications on this testbed. Furthermore, our proposed methodology not only 
works on the deployed testbed, but can also be applied to other OSNs (Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram) to detect flows from any malicious API-based applications for any NSPs.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PROBLEM SETTINGS AND DEFINITION 
 
Now that we have introduced the background and motivation for this project, and 
given an overview of our work in Chapter III, we can now provide a more specific 
problem formulation. In this chapter, we begin by introducing network flow data. After 
that, we explain how we define malicious API- based applications, benign API-based 
applications and human OSN behaviors. Our purpose in this project is to detect malicious 
API-based application behaviors based on network flows. Finally, we summarize the 
problem to be solved in this project.  
A. Network Flow  
Current network communication is based on packet switching. Traffic flow is a 
sequence of aggregated packet headers from a source computer to a destination computer. 
Flows are identified by a five-tuple key, including the IP protocol, source computer’s IP 
address and port number, and destination computer’s IP address and port number. There 
are several attributes used to describe a flow, and those attributes are extracted from 
packet headers, such as the flow start timestamp, end timestamp, source IP and port 
number, destination IP and port number, the IP protocol and the protocol’s attributes. If 
the TCP protocol is used, the flow may also include the TCP flag as its attribute. Flow 
attributes can also include statistical numbers for total bytes and total packets received by 
each flow. A flow data can have any attribute which can be read from packet headers. In 
this thesis, we use the widely used NetFlow (B Claise, 2004) format of network flow 
traffic. Figure 1 shows several examples of the NetFlow data.  
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Based on our description, the flow data can carry very limited sensitive social 
network user data, and it could be challenging to detect malicious social network flows 
for API-based applications. However, our research proves that it’s feasible to detect 
malicious API-based applications generated flows.  
 
Figure 1. Network flow traffic 
B. Project Framework  
In this part, we will introduce the framework of this project and answer some 
basic questions, such as how malicious or benign OSN applications and humans within a 
NSP communicate with OSN servers, where OSN network flow data inside a NSP can be 
caught, and where our proposed malicious flows detection method should be deployed to 
detect malicious flows for a NSP.  
Figure 2 shows the framework of this project. Our purpose is to detect flows 
generated by malicious OSN applications for NSPs. NSPs provide network services to 
their users, and a NSP could be part of an Internet Services Provider (ISP). For example, 
a company network is a NSP, because it can provide network services to all workers in its 
company.  
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Figure 2. Setting of a network service provider (NSP) in detecting malicious OSN 
network flows 
 
Human, benign OSN applications and malicious OSN applications in some NSPs 
can send requests to OSN severs. When OSN servers receive their requests, OSN servers 
will reply responses to the people or applications who sent requests in previous NSPs. 
Both requests from the NSP to OSN servers and responses from OSN servers to the NSP 
will go through the NSP’s border router. Therefore, the border router can collect flows 
generated between the application or human within its network and the OSN servers. Our 
malicious flow detection method can be deployed at the border router of the NSP. If there 
are some malicious flows detected at the border router, it can send some alerts to the 
NSP.  
NSP
OSN 
Internet
Human user
Benign OSN application
Malicious OSN application
Border router
Human request
Malicious application request
Benign application request
OSN response
malicious ﬂow detection algorithm
deployed at border router
ALERT!
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C. Malicious API-based Applications, Benign API-based Applications and Human 
OSN Behaviors  
1) Malicious API-based Application Behaviors 
Attackers usually run malicious API-based applications to frequently collect 
private OSN data or spread spam information on OSNs. Whether crawling behavior is 
benign or malicious can only be decided by how people use or analyze crawled data, and 
this is not our focus. In this project, we do not classify them as malicious only based on 
their crawling behaviors. This project mainly focus on detecting malicious API-based 
spammer applications on OSNs. The malicious behaviors to be detected are when 
malicious OSN API-based applications post or comment with spam content (post with 
malicious URLs for malwares, or spam advertisements) on OSNs. E.g. "Free Business 
Links For Chemical Suppliers at http://catalogs.indiamart.com/category/chemicals- 
fertilizers.html".  
Malicious API-based spam applications behave with malicious purposes, so their 
controlled benign accounts’ behavioral patterns are probably different from benign 
accounts. There are five known malicious patterns for malicious API application-
controlled spam/bot accounts on Twitter (CM Zhang, 2011). Those accounts’ 
post/retweet/like behavior time points on Twitter follow five malicious patterns in Figure 
3. Therefore, corresponding malicious API-based applications’ post/retweet/like time 
points should also follow those five known malicious patterns. For those five malicious 
patterns in Figure 3, the x axis indicates minutes of the hour for an account’s 
post/comment/like/retweet behavior time point, while the y axis indicates the seconds of 
the minute for this account’s post/comment/like/retweet behavior time point. 
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(a) Fixed malicious second pattern      (b) Fixed malicious interval pattern 
 
               
(b) Fixed malicious minute pattern    (d) Two fixed malicious minutes pattern 
 
         
             (e) Hybrid malicious pattern 
Figure 3. Malicious OSN application controlled accounts’ behavioral time points show 
five malicious patterns 
 
Attackers usually use OSN APIs to spread spam information by posting and 
commenting. In this project, we mainly focus on detecting malicious OSN applications 
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injecting spam contents into the network. In this situation, we define the two most 
common malicious API-based behaviors:  
(1) API-based post or comment with spam content for a single account.  
(2) API-based change accounts to post or comment with spam content.  
In this project, if any of those three API-based behaviors post spam posts or 
comments following any of five known malicious API usage patterns, we define it as a 
malicious API-based application behavior.  
2) Benign API-based Application Behaviors 
Some benign OSN API-based applications may use OSN-released APIs to 
provide people useful information, such as real-time weather warnings, earthquake 
information for a specific location, and news happening all around the world. In this 
project, we define benign OSN application behaviors are when OSN API-based 
applications post useful information to people.  
When OSN-released APIs are used for a benign purpose, public APIs are 
supposed to provide OSN services on those benign applications and work automatically 
for human beings with benign purposes whenever people need to post/comment/like. For 
example, "Flow" is a Microsoft application which integrates the Facebook API, Twitter 
API and Instagram API. It can help people post on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram at the 
same time when people want to publish their stories on multiple social networks. Since 
APIs are only tools for human beings to post and comment on OSNs, benign API usage 
behaviors should follow human beings’ post and comment patterns. It has been found that 
human post/comment/like time points on Twitter can be modeled as different Poisson 
Processes (CM Zhang, 2011). This benign pattern can be converted to the pattern in 
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Figure 4 which is drawn in a similar way to Figure 3’s depiction of five malicious 
patterns based on humans’ post/comment/like/retweet time points. The benign API-based 
application’s behavioral time point patterns should also follow this benign human 
post/comment pattern on OSNs. 
      
Figure 4. Benign API-based application controlled OSN accounts’ behavioral time points 
follow a benign pattern  
 
Therefore, in this project, if an API-based application posts benign 
posts/comments following this benign Poisson pattern, we define it as a benign API-
based application.  
3) Human OSN Behaviors 
In most cases, users visit social networks and perform some normal operations 
using browsers instead of APIs. Human beings usually access OSNs on browsers to do 
various operations, such as login, post, comment, browse and so on. Most OSN flows are 
generated by human operations on OSNs. In this project, we define various human-based 
browser operations on OSNs as normal behaviors, and define flow data generated by 
human operations as benign flows.  
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To summarize, we define three behaviors in Chapter IV: malicious API-based 
application behaviors, benign API-based application behaviors and human OSN 
behaviors. If APIs are used by applications to spread malicious information, then their 
behaviors follow five known bad timing patterns. If APIs are used by applications to 
spread benign information, then their behaviors follow the benign timing pattern. 
Humans can perform various operations on OSNs, and we define all human behaviors as 
benign. Our purpose is to detect flows for malicious API-based application behaviors 
from flows generated by all three behaviors. We assume that traffic flows of human OSN 
behaviors and benign API-based application behaviors share some benign flow-level 
features, while traffic flows of malicious API-based applications have some malicious 
flow-level features. We aim to detect flows of malicious API-based applications by 
detecting flows with malicious features.  
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CHAPTER V 
DATA PREPARATION 
 
Since there is no existing and available data set providing flows for malicious 
API-based application behaviors or benign OSN behaviors, we need to generate those 
data by ourselves. As described in the problem formulation from Chapter IV, we define 
three OSN behaviors in this project: malicious API-based application behaviors, benign 
API-based application behaviors, and human OSN behaviors. We will generate flows for 
those three behaviors.  
To generate flows for malicious API-based application behaviors, we have each 
malicious API-based OSN behavior simulate one of five malicious API usage timing 
patterns in posting malicious contents or malicious commenting contents by setting 
related parameters. To generate flows for benign API-based application behaviors, we 
have different API-based OSN behaviors simulate benign API usage timing patterns to 
post benign information by setting related parameters. In addition, we simulate all kinds 
of human operations on OSNs using browsers, and collect those generated flows as 
benign human OSN behavior flows.  
In this chapter, we will start by introducing the data preparation platform, then 
simulate malicious API-based application behaviors, benign API-based application 
behaviors and human OSN behaviors. After that, we describe how we synthesize flows 
for three behaviors respectively.  
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A. Data Preparation Platform  
As described in research method chapter, we deploy a small social network 
WordPress in order to replay our synthesized malicious API-based application behaviors, 
benign API-based behaviors and human OSN behaviors on this small social network.  
The small social network is a blog WordPress, where people can post and reply to 
each other. It is deployed on a reserved server on DigitalOcean with a fixed IP address 
165.227.20.24. The server is configured with 512 MB Memory, 20 GB Disk, and Ubuntu 
16.04.3 x64 Operating System. The client is a Dell laptop configured with 8GB Memory, 
128GB Disk, and Ubuntu 16.04 Operating System.  
We simulate malicious API-based application behaviors, benign API-based 
behaviors and human OSN behaviors on the client. The client is installed with traffic 
flow generation software softflowd and flow collection software nfdump. When we are 
simulating malicious API-based application behaviors, benign API-based behaviors and 
human OSN behaviors on the client separately, the flow data generation software 
softflowd and collection software nfdump are running on this client and collecting 
corresponding flow data for each behavior. In flow data generation and collection 
process, we collect flows mainly based on the below three defaulted flow collection 
parameters.  
(1) Maxlife value is set to 604800s. The value of this parameter is the maximum 
lifetime that a flow may exist for. The client and server may keep communicating 
to each other for a time longer than Maxlife. When the connection duration 
reaches to Maxlife, the current flow for the current connection will expire, and a 
new flow will be generated for describing this connection.  
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(2) Expint value is set to 60s. This parameter of Expin specifies the interval 
between expiry checks. This is to say, when the client and server are sending 
packets to each other, if the interval of two consecutive packets is within Expint 
time, they will be classified into the same flow. If the interval of two consecutive 
packets is larger than Expint time, they will be classified into different flows.  
(3) Flows have two directions: from source to destination, and from destination to 
source. If the traffic exceeds 2 Gib in either direction, then the corresponding 
flows will expire, and a new flow will be generated for continuous connections. 
Based on the above built testbed and its set up environment and parameters, we 
collect flows for malicious OSN API-based applications, benign OSN API-based 
applications and human behaviors.  
B. Synthesis of Malicious API-based Application Behaviors, Benign API-based 
Behaviors and Human OSN behaviors  
1) Synthesis of Human OSN Behaviors 
Since most OSN flows are generated by normal human operations on OSNs, it is 
very important to synthesize normal human beings’ behaviors accurately. We can then 
collect human OSN behavior flows accurately as ground truth. 
In order to simulate normal human beings’ behaviors comprehensively, we write 
scripts to simulate all kinds of human user behaviors on WordPress, e.g. login, browse, 
post, comment by browser. Table 1 shows all human basis operations on WordPress. 
Human beings’ operations on OSNs are driven by a series of click events on the browser. 
To simulate human behaviors accurately, the click event stream pattern in our scripts of 
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human operations on WordPress follows the click pattern summarized in a real Chinese 
social network RenRen (G Wang, 2017). 
Table 1. Human operations on OSN 
 
Category Event type 
Account Login 
Browse View a post (go to the post webpage, then go back to previous page or 
main page) 
Browser feeds (scroll mouse, may go next page, or view a post, then 
go back to previous page or main page) 
Return to previous page 
Go to main page 
Go to next page 
View a recent post 
View a recent comment 
Comment Login in then comment, no login and comment as a stranger 
Post Login then post 
 
Human behaviors on OSN can be summarized as a series of events switching to 
each other. Figure 2 visualizes the logic of how different events switch to each other. We 
write scripts to simulate 27 streamlines of human behavior chains based on event 
occurrence sequences, which cover almost all possible user operation streamlines on 
WordPress in the real world except infinite looping browsing posts.  
For each streamline, we simulate various possible streamline implementations in 
the real world by changing parameters to simulate its operation logic. For example, one 
of the streamline is: login, then view page 0-10 separately. To simulate this streamline, 
after a user finishes the login step, he or she may browser page 0, pages 0 to 1, pages 0,1, 
2,...., page 0,1,2 ...10 separately. In this way, we simulate nearly all possible 
implementations for this streamline by changing page parameters. For all remaining 
streamlines, we simulate various implementations by changing related parameters, so our 
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simulation covers nearly all possible human behaviors on this small social network 
accurately and comprehensively.  
 
Figure 5. Streamline of how different events switch to each other on WordPress  
 
2) Synthesis of Benign API-based Application Behaviors 
We will introduce how we synthesize benign OSN API-based application 
behaviors in this part. APIs provided by OSNs are supposed to be used for third party 
developers so they can integrate OSN services to their own developed software. Third 
party software are supposed to use API-provided OSN services to serve human beings 
automatically when people need their functions. Therefore, the benign API third party 
applications’ behavioral timing patterns should follow human post/comment/like patterns 
on OSN. It’s known that the timing pattern of how human post/comment/like on Twitter 
can be modeled as different Poisson Processes (CM Zhang, 2011), so benign API-based 
third party applications’ behavioral time points should follow these Poisson Processes. 
Besides API-based benign third party applications, there are some benign API-based bot 
applications on OSNs, and those bots could provide helpful weather warnings or 
broadcast useful news to the general public. Benign bot applications will post content on 
a social network whenever there is news or a warning, and those news and warnings 
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occurrence patterns can also be modeled as various Poisson Processes, so benign API-
based bot applications’ behavioral patterns can also be modeled as Poisson Processes. 
Thus, all benign API-based applications’ behaviors should follow the Poisson 
Distribution.  
              
(a) Example 1                                             (b) Example 2 
              
(c) Example 3                                             (d) Example 4 
Figure 6. Simulation of 4 benign API-based applications by changing Poisson parameters  
 
If API-based applications post benign contents following this benign Poisson 
pattern in Figure 4, we define it as benign API usage behaviors. To simulate all possible 
benign API-based application behaviors, we crawl benign posts’ data from benign 
automatic accounts on Twitter, and simulate posting benign information behaviors. Their 
behavior time points follow various benign Poisson processes by changing different 
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parameters. Figure 6 shows four examples of our simulated benign API-based application 
behavioral timing patterns with four different Poisson parameters. 
3) Synthesis of Malicious API-based Application Behaviors 
Malicious OSN API-based applications behave with malicious purposes to post 
malicious data, and those applications’ behavior patterns are probably different from 
benign accounts. As we discussed in Chapter IV, there are five known malicious API-
based application behavioral timing patterns. We have also defined two categories of the 
most common API-based behaviors as API-based post or comment with spam contents 
for a single account or API-based change accounts to post or comment with spam 
contents.  
We download a Twitter dataset which provides malicious content that were 
posted or commented by malicious spam accounts. To simulate various malicious API-
based application behaviors, we have the behavior time points for each API-based OSN 
behavior decided by five known malicious timing patterns. The application will post or 
comment malicious content at each behavior time point. We model each malicious timing 
pattern as combinations of different probability distributions, and simulate each malicious 
timing pattern by changing related parameters for corresponding probability distributions.  
We take the first malicious API-based malicious pattern as an example. Based on 
observations, the probability density function of the first malicious timing pattern can be 
modeled as the combination of a uniform distribution (!0)  and a group exponential 
distributions (l#$l%) with the same l value. Therefore, we can obtain the first malicious 
timing pattern probability density as formula 1. In formula 1, !0 is the possibility density 
for the uniform distribution, while l#$l(%$'(∗*$(+) indicates probability densities for 
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multiple exponential distributions. The parameter -0 can adjust the weight of all 
exponential distribution densities. ./ is the time step length between each two adjacent 
exponential distributions, while /0 is the initialized time step length for the first 
exponential distribution. Parameters l can decide the shape for all exponential 
distributions.  
To simulate various implementations of the first malicious API usage timing 
patterns, we change parameters l, !0, -0, ./ and /0 in its density function, then use the 
density function with various changed parameters to simulate different first malicious 
API usage patterns. Figure 7 shows four simulation results for the first malicious API 
usage timing pattern with different parameters.  
In a similar way, the probability density of the second malicious timing pattern 
can be modeled as a combination of a uniform distribution and a group normal 
distributions with the same 1. The third malicious API usage timing pattern probability 
density is a combination of a uniform distribution and a group of Poisson distributions 
with the same 1. The fourth malicious API usage timing pattern can be modeled as a 
combination of a uniform distribution and two group Poisson distributions with 
parameters l1 and l2 separately, while the probability density for the fifth malicious 
timing pattern can be modeled as a combination of a uniform distribution and two group 
normal distributions with parameters 11 and 12 separately. All probability density 
functions for the five malicious API usage patterns are shown in formula 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
respectively.  
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41 5, l = !0 + -0 8#$9 %$'(∗*$(+*:;*:+ 1 	
	
f2 t, δ = P0 + M0 1δ 2π e$ C$DE∗F$E+ GHIG
F:J
F:+ 2  
 
f3 t, l = P0 + M0 e$Lλ C$DE∗F$E+t − dT ∗ k − T0 !F:JF:+ (3) 
 
f4 t, l1, l2 = P0 + M1 e$LTλ1 C$DET∗F$ETt − dT1 ∗ k − T1 !F:JF:+ + 	M2 e
$LHλ1 C$DEH∗F$EHt − dT2 ∗ k − T2 !F:JF:+ 4  
 
f5 t, δ1, δ2 = P0 + M1 1δ1 2π e$ C$DET∗F$ET GHITG
F:J
F:+ + 	M2 1δ2 2π e$
C$DEH∗F$EH GHIHGF:JF:+ 5  
 
 
As we described above, there are two categories of the most common API-based 
malicious behaviors, each behavior’s post or comment contains malicious content, and 
their behavioral time points are decided by any of five malicious API usage timing 
patterns. To simulate each malicious timing pattern accurately, we build a probability 
function for it, and simulate various implementations for this malicious timing pattern by 
changing related parameters in its corresponding probability function. We have each API-
based behavior’s time points follow five malicious patterns separately by changing 
corresponding probability function parameters for each malicious pattern. In this way, we 
can simulate various malicious API-based applications’ posts or comments of various 
malicious content with five known malicious patterns, and our simulation result is able to 
cover nearly all possible five known malicious API-based application behaviors.  
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(a) Example 1                                             (b) Example 2 
                
(c) Example 3                                             (d) Example 4 
Figure 7. Four simulation results for the first malicious API-based application  
 
C. Synthesis of Flows for Malicious API-based Applications, Benign API-based 
Applications and Human OSN Behaviors  
In the above Chapter V, we have introduced how we simulate malicious API-
based applications, benign API-based applications and human OSN behaviors to generate 
corresponding flow-level data. In this part, we will describe how we synthesize flows for 
malicious API-based applications, benign API-based applications and human OSN 
behaviors. To begin with, we explain why it’s necessary to synthesize flows for those 
three behaviors. After that, we introduce more details about how to synthesize flows for 
these three behaviors.  
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To speed up ground truth generation time, we synthesize flows for malicious API-
based applications, benign API-based applications and human OSN behaviors. We 
simulate users’ behaviors in both user active time and user waiting time. During user 
active time, users visit OSNs actively, and perform various operations on OSNs. During 
user waiting time, users don’t access OSNs and don’t do any operations on OSNs. To 
generate ground truth, we write scripts to simulate user behaviors both in their active time 
and in their waiting time. However, for both benign user accounts and malicious user 
accounts, the waiting time is much longer than the active time. Therefore, the speed of 
ground truth generation is very slow because a lot of time is wasted on simulating user 
waiting time.  
However, during user waiting time, there are no corresponding flows generated 
because users don’t communicate with OSNs during waiting time. In addition, based on 
observations, we find that a single API or human behavior on OSN can generate several 
flows. Even if API or human behavior time points are very close, an identical API or 
human behavior occurring at different time points can generate different flows. Not only 
could flow numbers generated by the same behavior be different, but also the attribute 
values of each flow are different, such as flow start time, flow number, flow duration, 
TCP flag, packets number, bytes, and so on. Therefore, flows generated by a single 
behavior at different time are independent and different. Since there are no flows 
generated during waiting time, we can synthesize flows for malicious and benign 
behaviors by combining flows of different OSN behaviors together and only change 
flows’ generation time attributes.  
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The following paragraphs will discuss how to synthesize flows for long time 
malicious and benign API-based application behaviors, and human behaviors.  
1) Synthesis of Flows for Malicious and Benign API-based Applications 
Our methodology of how to synthesize flows for automated malicious and benign 
API usage behaviors in a long period of time follows the logic stated below.  
(1)  To begin, collect flows generated by a single post or comment API operation. 
Benign applications will post or comment with benign content, while malicious 
applications will post or comment with malicious content. Save those flows into a 
file, then each file will include all flows generated by this single API operation.  
(2)  In a similar way, repeat multiple single API post or comment operations, and 
save those flows into multiple flow files.  
(3)  For each malicious and benign API behavior, we combine flow files 
generated by corresponding single API operations with different intervals 
separately into a large flow file by only changing each flow’s start and end time, 
while keep all other attributes the same. Time intervals are generated based on 
which malicious timing pattern and benign timing pattern the benign or malicious 
API-based application follows.  
Based on the above method, the large generated flow file is the synthesized flows 
for malicious and benign API behaviors in a long period of time, and we can generate 
flows for each malicious and benign API-based application based on the time span we 
defined. We design Algorithm 1 to synthesize flows for OSN API based applications in a 
predefined time span. We first introduce the following definitions, and the Algorithm 1 is 
followed by those definitions. 
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(1) Flows set M: For each single benign or malicious OSN application post or 
comment behavior, we repeat those single behaviors for a large amount of 
times, then collect flows generated by each behavior into a separate file. The 
set M consists all those files, and each file includes all flows generated by a 
single OSN application behavior. 
(2) Possibility density function F: For a malicious or a benign OSN application, 
its behave time points follow a particular timing pattern, and F is the 
corresponding possibility density function for that timing pattern. 
(3) timeCount: This parameter indicates the time span of the flows we are 
synthesizing for the application. 
(4) Possibility[t]: The possibility density that an OSN application at time point t 
will do a post or comment behavior. 
(5) Set R: all flows in set R are the synthesized flows for an OSN application in 
timeCount seconds. 
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Algorithm 1: Generation of flows for Malicious or Benign OSN applications 
1:     Input: flows set M, a random behavior possibility density function F 
2:     Initialize possibility density array Possibility[timeCount] 
3:     Initialize timeCount as 24*60*60 seconds 
4:     Initialize result set R as empty set 
5:     FOR t in timeCount DO 
6:             Possibility[t] := F(t) 
7:     END FOR 
8:     FOR t in timeCount DO 
9:             Generated a random number rand which range in (0,1) 
10:           IF rand < Possibility[t] THEN 
11:                    Select flows S generated by a single OSN behavior in M 
12:                    Record the start time of first flow in S as firstStart 
13:                    FOR f in S DO 
14:                            IF f is the first flow THEN 
15:                                  Compute   f’s start time as t 
16:                                  Compute   f’s end time as t + f’s end time - firstStart 
17:                            ELSE 
18:                                  Compute  f’s start time as t + f’s start time - firstStart 
19:                                  Compute  f’s end time as t + f’s end time - firstStart 
20:                            END IF 
21:                    END FOR 
22:           Add those updated flows in S to result set R 
23:           END IF 
24:     END FOR 
25:     Output:  flows set R is synthesized flows for a malicious OSN application 
 
2) Synthesis of Flows for Human OSN Behaviors 
The method of synthesizing human OSN flows is a little different from 
synthesizing flows for malicious and benign API applications. For API-based 
applications, their behaviors mainly consist of different API-based post or comment 
behaviors. However, human operations on social networks are much different, so we 
collect user follows based on a single user session instead of a single operation on social 
networks. A single user session includes all activities from a user opening an OSN 
webpage to closing it, and the user may perform various operations on OSNs at each user 
session, as discussed in Chapter V. The user session time duration distribution and click 
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event pattern follow the pattern summarized in the real Chinese social network RenRen 
(G Wang, 2017).  
To generate flows for human behaviors in a long time period, we combine flows 
generated by different user sessions together, only changing each flow’s start and end 
time. Our methodology of how to synthesize flows for human behaviors in a long time 
period follows the steps below.  
(1) First, collect flows generated by a single user session, then save those flows 
into a file. Each file includes all flows generated by this single user session.  
(2)  In a similar way, save multiple flow files generated by multiple user sessions.  
(3)  Combine flow files generated by each user session with different Poisson 
intervals into a large flow file by only changing each flow’s start and end time 
while keeping other attributes the same. Human beings’ use of social network 
intervals follow the Poisson distribution, so we use Poisson intervals here.  
In this way, the generated large flow file is the synthesis of flows for human 
behaviors in a long time period, and we can generate flows for human OSN behaviors 
based on our defined time span. Our methodology of how to synthesize flows for human 
behaviors in a long time period follows Algorithm 2. We first introduce the following 
definitions, and Algorithm 2 is followed by those definitions. 
(1) Flows set H: Each human user behavior in a human user session is instructed 
by the finite state machine. We run the finite state machine a large amount of 
times, then collect flows for each human user session, store corresponding 
flows for each behavior into a separate file. The set H consists all those files, 
and each file includes all flows generated by a single human user session. 
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(2) Intervals[]: Two adjacent human user sessions may have various intervals, and 
those intervals can be modeled as various Poisson process, the Intervals[] 
stored the intervals generated by a Poisson process. 
(3) timeCount: This parameter indicates the time span of the flows we are 
synthesizing for the human user. 
(4) curTime: Current time of synthesizing flows compared with the whole time 
span. 
(5) Set R: all flows in set R are the synthesized flows for a human user in 
timeCount seconds. 
Algorithm 2: Generation of flows for OSN human behaviors 
1:     Input: flows set H, a random user session intervals array Intervals[] 
2:     Initialize curTime as 0, interval counter i as 0 
3:     Initialize timeCount as 24*60*60 seconds 
4:     Initialize result set R as empty set 
5:     WHILE curTime + Interval[i] < timeCount DO 
6:             Compute curTime as curTime + Interval[i] 
7:             Select flows S generated by a single OSN user session behavior in H 
8:             Record the start time of first flow in S as firstStart 
9:             FOR f in S DO 
10:                   IF f is the first flow THEN 
11:                         Compute   f’s start time as curTime 
12:                         Compute   f’s end time as curTime + f’s end time - firstStart 
13:                   ELSE 
14:                         Compute  f’s start time as curTime + f’s start time - firstStart 
15:                         Compute  f’s end time as curTime + f’s end time - firstStart 
16:                   END IF 
17:           END FOR 
18:           Add those updated flows in S to result set R 
19:           Increase i as i + 1 
20:           END IF 
21:     END WHILE 
22:     Output:  flows set R is synthesized flows for a human user in a day 
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3) How We Control Flow Attributes When Generating Synthetic Flows  
Each flow includes several attributes, such as flow start time, flow end time, flow 
duration, source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, TCP flag, and packets 
number in each flow. In this section, we will discuss what attributes of flow are 
controlled in our synthesized flows, and how we control different attributes for 
synthesized flows.  
For both benign and malicious OSN applications, their behavior can be defined 
from two aspects. The first is to decide when OSN applications do post or comment 
behaviors, the second is to decide what content they post or comment each time. For 
malicious OSN applications, their post or comment time points are decided by five 
malicious timing patterns by varying all possible parameters in our proposed malicious 
pattern formulations. The spam content (e.g. post with malicious URL) that they 
post/comment is downloaded from a Twitter spam dataset. The malicious OSN 
applications may use 1 or multiple accounts to post/comment spam information. For 
benign OSN applications, their post or comment time points are decided by a benign 
Poisson pattern by varying all possible parameters in Poisson distribution. The benign 
content (e.g. post for weather warnings) that they post is crawled from online benign bot-
controlled Twitter accounts.  
We have summarized how we simulate malicious and benign OSN application 
behaviors. Now we will answer the question of how we control flow attributes for benign 
and malicious OSN application behaviors. To begin, for malicious OSN applications, five 
malicious timing patterns decide flows’ start time and the behavior of "post or comment 
with spam content for 1 or multiple accounts" decides the flows’ other features. After 
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that, for benign OSN applications, 1 benign timing pattern decides the flows’ start time, 
and the behavior of "post or comment with benign content" decides the flows’ other 
features.  
For human behaviors, we use 27 streamlines of human behavior chains based on 
different event occurrence sequences to simulate all possible operations during each user 
session. A user session includes all human activities, from a user opening an OSN 
webpage to closing it. In each user session, user behaviors are actually driven by a series 
of click events, and the click event interval distribution in a user session is decided by the 
click pattern summarized in the real Chinese social network RenRen (G Wang, 2017). 
Since a human user may visit a social network several times a day, a human user may 
generate several user sessions. The intervals between different user sessions follow the 
Poisson distribution.  
For human behaviors, the timing pattern of "Poisson distribution for intervals 
between user sessions" and "click events’ distribution within a user session" work 
together to decide flows’ start time, and various human behavior streamlines decide 
flows’ other features.  
To summarize, in Chapter V we introduce how we simulate benign API-based 
application behaviors, malicious API-based application behaviors and human behaviors. 
After that, to speed up data generation, we synthesize flows for long periods of time of 
benign and malicious API-based application behaviors and human OSN behaviors. We 
also analyze how we control flow-level features for different synthesized flows.  
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CHAPTER VI 
DEEP LEARNING BASED APPROACH OF DETECTING 
FLOWS FROM MALICIOUS API-BASED APPLICATIONS 
We have discussed how to generate flows for malicious API-based applications, 
benign API-based applications and human OSN behaviors. Our purpose is to detect flows 
from malicious API-based applications. In this chapter, we will introduce how to use our 
generated ground truth to train a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model. This 
chapter also includes model selection, ground truth labeling, dataset size, data 
preprocessing and model structure.  
A. Model Selection  
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) has been a very popular tool to finish 
various machine learning tasks in recent years. It is particularly powerful to learn 
hierarchical level features from complex high dimension data automatically, then finish 
classification task effectively. The aggregated flows in our project are actually high 
dimension data, so CNN is a good tool to classify malicious API flows and other benign 
flows. CNN needs uniform input size, but each of the aggregated flows in our project 
contains a different number of flows. Therefore, we normalize each of the aggregated 
flows by transforming each of the aggregated flows into an image. Each image still 
reserves the main useful information of each aggregated flow group, and then normalized 
images are used as the input to train the CNN model.  
B. Ground Truth Labeling  
There are three OSN behaviors defined in this thesis: malicious API-based 
application behaviors, benign API-based application and human OSN behaviors. Our 
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purpose is to detect flows of malicious API-based application behaviors separately from 
flows generated by all three behaviors. For flows generated by malicious API-based 
application behaviors, we label them as malicious flows. For flows generated by benign 
API-based application behaviors and human behaviors on social networks, we label them 
as benign flows.  
C. Dataset Size  
For flows generated by each malicious API-based application behaviors and 
benign behaviors, we aggregate their flows, and then convert each aggregated flow into 
an image, which can act as the normalized input of CNN model. We generate 40,000 
aggregated flows for both benign behaviors and malicious API application behaviors. The 
data size of categorized aggregated flows for each behavior is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Aggregated flows number for each OSN behaviors 
Aggregated flow type # of aggregated flows 
Aggregated malicious OSN application flows 15,000 
Aggregated benign OSN application flows 15,000 
Aggregated human user operations flows 10,000 
 
As we talked about in the data generation chapter, there are five malicious API-
based applications. They post or comment with spam contents, and behavior time points 
decided by five malicious timing patterns. We represent malicious applications with 
different malicious API usage timing patterns as bad1, bad2, bad3, bad4, and bad5, and 
represent the benign API- based applications with benign timing pattern as good1, while 
human behaviors are labeled as good0. Table 3 has shown generated aggregated flows’ 
size for each applications’ malicious timing patterns and benign timing patterns. The data 
set is split into a training set and a test set. The training set has 80% of all labeled 
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aggregated data, while the test set includes 20% of all labeled aggregated data. The 
32,000 training set are used to train the CNN model, while we reserve 8,000 test data to 
evaluate the performance of the trained model. 
Table 3. Aggregated flows number for applications with different malicious/benign 
application patterns 
Aggregated flow pattern type # of aggregated flows 
Malicious application pattern bad1 3,000 
Malicious application pattern bad2 3,000 
Malicious application pattern bad3 3,000 
Malicious application pattern bad4 3,000 
Malicious application pattern bad5 3,000 
Benign application pattern good0 15,000 
Benign human user pattern good1 10,000 
 
D. Flow Data Preprocessing  
For flows generated by each application and human behaviors, we will preprocess 
flows first, then train a deep learning model using preprocessed flows instead of raw 
flows. The flow pre-processing process includes several steps: flow extraction, 
aggregation, and normalizing aggregated flows into images. Normalized images will be 
act as the input of the deep learning model.  
First, we need to extract the OSN-generated flows. When we visit the small social 
network WordPress on the client side, the client is actually communicating with the 
server of our deployed small social network, and this process can generate a lot of 
network packets. The client is installed with flow data generation and collection software, 
so it can generate and collect flow data based on current incoming and outgoing packets 
on this client. However, when we simulate those three kinds of behavior on our client, the 
client is probably communicating with multiple network servers at the same time, so our 
collected flow data not only contains flows communicating with the WordPress server, 
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but also includes flows generated by other applications on the client. Therefore, we need 
to extract those flow data, which are generated by communication traffic between this 
client and the WordPress server. To collect those flows generated by our synthesized 
behaviors, we extract flows whose source IPs or destination IPs belong to the WordPress 
server. Our IP address matching method can also extract flows generated by other OSNs, 
such as Twitter and Facebook.  
After extracting WordPress traffic flows on the client, we will aggregate flow 
data. A single simple behavior on WordPress and any other website can generate several 
traffic flows, so a single traffic flow can carry very little information about how users 
actually operate on an OSN. Therefore, we want to aggregate traffic flows that occur in a 
relatively long pre-specified time window. The aggregated traffic flows can then carry 
information of how a user behaves in the pre-specified time window. Aggregated flows 
only collect flows that occurred in a specific time slot, and still preserve each flow’s start 
time, end time and other attributes, so the timing and other features are still preserved in 
aggregated flows. If an API-based application is used with malicious purposes in this pre-
specified time window, we can detect those aggregated traffic flows from this client.  
Since aggregated flows have a different number of flows, and the CNN model 
needs uniform input size, we normalize the input of each aggregated flows by converting 
it to an image which carries the main useful information for the aggregated flows. Each 
aggregated flow group is converted into a scatter image, and each point in this scatter 
image carries the main information for a flow in this aggregated flow group. A flow is 
converted to a point in the image, so the image consists of all points converted by all 
flows in an aggregated flow group.  
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A point carries four main attributes information from the corresponding flow: 
flow start time, flow duration, packet number and TCP flag. Those four attributes 
information of a flow are converted to a point’s location and (R, G, B) color value in the 
image. To be more specific, flow start time attribute decides a point’s location (x, y) in 
this image: x axis is the flow’s generated minute, while y axis is the flow’s generated 
second. The flow duration attribute decides the point’s R value, the packet number 
attribute decides the point’s G value, while the TCP flag decides the point’s B value. In 
this way, the four main useful attributes of a single flow data are carried by the 
corresponding point’s four features in the scatter image. Each converted image can carry 
information for all flows with their four attributes’ information in the aggregated flow 
group. In Figure 8, there are three examples of three converted images of aggregated 
flows from malicious API-based application behaviors, benign API-based application 
behaviors and human behaviors separately.  
 
(a) Benign application flows      (b) Human user flows       (c) Malicious application flows 
 
Figure 8. Converted images for human, malicious application and benign application 
flows 
 
E. CNN Model Structure  
By changing all related parameters and layers, the CNN model with structure in 
Figure 9 can achieve the best performance. Our trained CNN model consists of 10 layers. 
In the CNN model, the output of the previous layer is the input of the next layer, as seen 
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in Figure 9. The first layer is the input of the model, and the last layer is the prediction 
result of the model. The input layer of the model takes 128*128*3 dimension matrixes as 
input, which are read from images converted from aggregated flows. For each input data, 
the CNN model can predict it with label 0 or label 1 at the output layer. If it is predicted 
with 0, it indicates that the flows are generated by benign API-based application 
behaviors or human behaviors on OSNs. If it’s predicted with 1, it indicates that the flows 
are generated by malicious API-based application behaviors.  
 
Figure 9. CNN model structure 
conv2d_1_input: InputLayer
conv2d_1: Conv2D
max_pooling2d_2: MaxPooling2D
conv2d_2: Conv2D
max_pooling2d_1: MaxPooling2D
conv2d_3: Conv2D
max_pooling2d_3: MaxPooling2D
ﬂatten_1: Flatten
dense_1: Dense
dense_2: Dense
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To summarize, in this chapter, we describe how to label data, the preprocessing of 
flows into images to train the CNN model, and the training of the CNN model structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  45 
CHAPTER VII 
EVALUATION 
 
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of our trained CNN model. Four 
metrics are used to evaluate the detection performance of the trained CNN model: 
accuracy, recall, precision and F1-measure. To begin with, we evaluate the overall 
detection result for all test set data. After that, we evaluate the detection performance 
when malicious API-based applications post or comment 10 times, 20 times, 30 times, 40 
times, and 50 times. Afterwards, to obtain a better understanding of how our CNN model 
can detect each malicious API-based application’s behaviors effectively, we evaluate 
CNN’s detection performance when each malicious API-based application posts or 
comments 10 times, 20 times, 30 times, 40 times, and 50 times. At last, we evaluate the 
performance of the trained CNN model by detecting flows generated by three real world 
API-based malicious applications and three API-based benign applications.  
A. Test Set Size and Evaluation Metrics  
We reserve 8,000 (20% of generated ground truth data) aggregated flows as the 
test set. The test set includes aggregated flows for malicious API-based application 
behaviors, benign API-based application behaviors, and human behaviors on social 
networks. Their corresponding data sizes are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Test set data size for each behavior 
Test set aggregated flow type # of aggregated flows 
Malicious API-based applications 3,000 
Benign API-based applications 3,000 
Human OSN behaviors 2,000 
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We adopt the four most commonly-used metrics of accuracy, recall, precision and 
F1-measure to evaluate the performance of our trained CNN model. Accuracy is the 
proportion of predictions that are correct. Recall is the measurement of how many actual 
positive observations are predicted correctly. Precision measures how many positive 
predictions are actual positive observations. F1-measure is the harmony of precision and 
recall. We have /!, /W, X! and XW indicating the number of true positive, true negative, 
false positive and false negative in prediction results. Thus, all four metrics can be 
formulated based on /!, /W, X! and XW. 
YZZ[\]Z^ = /! + /W/! + /W + X! + XW 6  
`#Z]aa = /!/! + XW 7  
 !\#Zcdcef = /!/! + X! 8  
 X1 − h#]d[\# = 2/!2/! + X! + XW 9  
 
B. Overall Detection Performance for All Test Set  
To begin with, we evaluate the overall performance of the trained CNN model by 
predicting the whole test set. As shown in Figure 10, the overall performance of our 
model is very good. It can achieve very high scores for accuracy, precision, recall and F1-
measure at the same time.  
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Figure 10. Detection performance for predicting all test sets  
 
C. Detection Performance for Malicious API-based Applications with Different 
Post/Comment Frequencies  
In part VII, it is shown that the trained CNN model’s overall prediction 
performance is very good. In this part, we would like to check if when malicious API-
based applications’ post/comment times vary from 10 to 50 times, our trained model can 
detect those malicious API applications effectively.  
In Figure 11, the x axis indicates malicious API applications post/comment total 
times in the aggregated flows, while the y axis shows our model’s corresponding 
detection performance. Based on observation, we find that when malicious applications 
post/comment less frequently, our model’s detection accuracy is relatively low. The 
accuracy is nearly 89.9% when malicious APIs post 10 times in a day. As malicious 
patterns post/comment increasingly frequently, our model’s detection accuracy increases, 
and will reach up to nearly 99.3% when malicious APIs post 50 times.  
  48 
When malicious API-based applications act more frequently, their malicious 
patterns become increasingly obvious, such that their flows become more easily detected 
by our model. Figure 12 compares two examples of the first malicious API application 
with different post/comment times. The Figure 12a shows when the first malicious API 
application posts only 10 times, and has a malicious pattern which is not that obvious. In 
Figure 12b, the malicious pattern is much more obvious when it posts 50 times than when 
it posts 10 times. Therefore, we can find when malicious API-based applications post 
times increase, their malicious patterns will become more obvious. Our method can 
detect flows from frequently-acting API-based applications more effectively. 
 
Figure 11. Detection performance for malicious API usage with different 
posting/commenting times per day 
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(a) 10 times                                                         (b) 50 times  
Figure 12. Comparison for malicious API application #1 posting/commenting 10 and 50 
times, respectively 
 
D. Detection Performance for Each Malicious API-based Application with 
Different Post/Comment Frequencies  
To obtain a better understanding of how our trained model can detect each 
malicious API-based application’s generated flows effectively when the application 
posts/comments times changes, we display another group of detection results for each 
malicious application with post/comment frequency changing from 10 times, 20 times, 30 
times, 40 times to 50 times per day.  
Figure 13 shows the performance of our trained model in detecting flows of each 
malicious API-based applications when their posting frequency changes from 10 times to 
50 times per day. Based on our observation, we found that the detection result shows two 
patterns. For malicious API-based application bad1 and bad3, when post/comment times 
are less frequent, our model’s detection accuracy is very low. When their posts/comments 
become more frequent, our model’s detection accuracy increases until it is very high. 
However, for malicious API- based application bad2, bad4 and bad5, our model’s 
detection accuracy is always very high.  
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(a)Malicious application #1                        (b) Malicious application #2 
 
(c)Malicious application #3                        (d) Malicious application #4 
    
   (e) Malicious application #5 
Figure 13. Detection results for each malicious API-based application 
posting/commenting 10 to 50 times per day 
 
The reason why those results show two different patterns are related to how 
different malicious API-based applications post/comment. The example of bad1 and bad2 
is shown in Figure 14. For bad1, post/comment behavior time has relatively long 
intervals. When it posts less frequently (e.g., 10 times per day) the bad1 pattern is not 
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obvious, so our model’s detection accuracy is low. For bad2, post/comment behaviors 
mainly focus on a short time period. Even if it posts less frequently (e.g., 10 times per 
day), its malicious pattern is still very obvious, so our model’s detection accuracy for 
bad2 is always high.  
                  
(a) bad1                                                          (b) bad2  
Figure 14. Comparison for bad1 application and bad2 application for 
posting/commenting 10 times per day 
      
We also observed another phenomenon: when bad1 and bad3 post less frequently, 
even if our model’s detection accuracy scores are low, the precision scores are still very 
high. Precision is a measurement of how many positive predictions are actual positive 
observations. We represent malicious API behaviors as positive, which is described in 
chapter VI. This high precision result indicates that our model’s predicted malicious 
flows are very likely to be actual malicious flows, and our model may predict malicious 
flows as benign flows. This indicates when the behavior patterns of some malicious API-
based applications are not obvious, our model can mistakenly predict those malicious 
flows as benign.  
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E. Detection Performance for Detecting Real World API-based Benign Applications 
and Malicious Applications  
Since we have evaluated the performance of the trained model based on five 
synthesized malicious applications, we must demonstrate that our synthetic flows are 
very close to the real world generated malicious and benign flows. In this section, we use 
our trained CNN model to detect flows from three real world malicious OSN API-based 
applications and three real world benign OSN API-based applications.  
The three real world benign OSN API-based applications are an earthquake bot 
providing real time earthquakes happening in specific locations, a news bot providing 
important news to people, and a weather warning bot reporting weather warning 
information. The three malicious OSN API-based applications are all spam applications.  
We collected and aggregated corresponding flows by running those applications 
on our platform, and then used our trained model to detect aggregated flows generated by 
three malicious applications and three benign applications. Figure 16 shows our model’s 
performance for detecting flows for malicious API-based application behaviors. As we 
can see, our detection model performs well and can detect malicious flows with accuracy 
as high as 99.7%, 98.8% and 99.1%. Figure 15 shows the performance for detecting 
flows for benign API-based application behaviors. Our detection model performs well 
and can detect benign application flows with accuracy as high as 93.4%, 91.1% and 
99.2%. The precision score is 0, and recall and F1-measure cannot be calculated because 
of no instances of true positive (TP) and false negative (FN) results. All samples are 
either correctly predicted as TN or mistakenly predicted as FP. The Figure shows that our 
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model can detect flows from real world benign and malicious API-based applications 
well.  
 
Figure 15. Detection results for flows generated by three real world malicious 
API-based OSN applications 
 
 
Figure 16. Detection results for flows generated by three real world benign API-
based OSN applications 
 
To summarize, our trained CNN model might be not able to identify flows for 
some malicious API-based applications very accurately when they only post/comment 10 
times per day. When their post/comment times increase to at least 20 times per day, our 
model shows very good prediction performance. In addition, our model is also able to 
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label flows generated by real world benign and malicious OSN API-based applications 
with good performance.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, we are going to discuss some concerns and the future work for this 
research. The first concern is that some people are worried that a single timing pattern 
feature is enough to detect flows generated by malicious OSN applications, and therefore 
it is unnecessary to train a deep learning model based on other features. The second is 
that people may claim that our project can only detect flows from malicious OSN 
programs that demonstrate similar timing patterns as the five malicious timing patterns 
we used. For future studies, we are going to discuss the real-world applications of our 
work in helping NSP detect flows from malicious OSN applications.  
A. Is A Single Timing Pattern Feature Enough to Detect Flows Generated by 
Malicious OSN Applications?  
Malicious OSN applications have the malicious purpose of spreading spam 
information, so their behavior patterns are probably different from benign applications 
and human behaviors. It is known that malicious OSN applications’ behavior timing 
patterns may be different from benign applications and human behaviors based on 
previous papers, and some people may think that a single timing pattern feature is 
sufficient to detect flows generated by malicious OSN applications. In this project, we 
train a deep learning model based on four features: flow start time, flow duration, packet 
number in each flow, and TCP flag in each flow. To investigate this concern, in this 
section, we train another CNN model only based on the timing feature, and show the 
detection result for the whole test set in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17. Detection result for predicting the test set for the model with only the 
timing feature 
 
As we can see, the detection accuracy of the single timing-feature based CNN 
model can only reach to 82.5% percentage accuracy and 70.2% precision. The 70.2% 
precision indicates only 70.2% labeled malicious flows are actually maliciously-
generated by malicious OSN applications, and many benign flows may be mislabeled as 
malicious. The detection performance of the single timing-feature based model is much 
worse than our trained four-feature based deep learning model. In our four-feature based 
deep learning model, the detection result for the whole test set achieved accuracy as high 
as 98.7% and precision as high as 97.5%.  
To obtain a better understanding of why the timing feature-based model obtains 
overall lower accuracy and lower precision, we investigated four questions and trained 
four timing-feature based models to answer those questions: (1) Can we distinguish 
malicious application flows from benign application flows from just their timing 
features? Model 1: trained under the presence of only malicious and benign application 
flows (2) Can we distinguish malicious application flows from human flows from just 
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their timing features? Model 2: trained under the presence of only malicious application 
flows and human flows (3) Can we distinguish benign application flows from human 
flows from just their timing features? Model 3: trained under the presence of only benign 
application flows and human flows (4) Can we distinguish benign application flows, 
malicious application flows, and human flows from just their timing features? Model 4: 
trained under the presence of benign application flows, malicious application, and human 
flows.  
Table 5. Detection accuracy result for different flow combinations in each timing-based 
model 
 Malicious application 
detection accuracy 
Benign application 
detection accuracy 
Human behavior 
detection accuracy 
Model 1 96.0% 98.9% - 
Model 2 99.6% - 75.8% 
Model 3 0 99.6% 99.2% 
Model 4 96.7% 98.9% 25.1% 
 
In Table 5, the timing-feature based Model 1 is trained by malicious application 
flows and benign application flows. We find that Model 1 can label flows from benign 
applications with accuracy as high as 98.9%, and flows from malicious applications with 
accuracy as high as 96.0%. This result indicates that a single timing feature is enough to 
distinguish flows generated by malicious applications or benign applications. For timing-
feature based Model 2 which is trained by flows from malicious applications and human 
behaviors, we find that our trained Model 2 can label malicious application flows with an 
accuracy of 99.6%, while label flows from human behavior only with an accuracy of 
75.8%. This indicates that a single timing pattern is not enough to distinguish flows 
generated by malicious applications or human behaviors. For Model 3 trained by benign 
application flows and human flows, the detection performance for labeling benign 
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application flows and human flows is very good, and a single timing feature is enough to 
distinguish flows generated by benign applications or human behaviors.  
For timing-feature based Model 4 trained by human flows, benign application 
flows and malicious application flows, we find that the model can distinguish benign and 
malicious application flows with very good performance, but detection of human flows 
resulted in very low accuracy. Based on Model 1, we know the timing feature is enough 
to distinguish benign application flows or malicious application flows. From Model 3, we 
know we know the timing feature is enough to distinguish benign application flows or 
human flows. In Model 2, human flows can be mislabeled as malicious flows when only 
detecting with the timing feature. Model 4 resulted in low accuracy in detecting human 
flows, and this is also caused by some human flows being mislabeled as malicious 
application flows (we have checked the detection result in labeling human flows, and 
many human flows are indeed mislabeled as malicious in Model 4), which is the same as 
Model 2. In Model 2, the model has already had a very hard time distinguishing human 
flows from malicious application flows only based on the timing feature. It can be 
understandable for Model 4 to have bad performance when distinguishing human flows 
from benign and malicious application flows too.  
We can conclude based on Table 5 that the timing feature is not sufficient for 
distinguishing between human and malicious applications, but can help distinguish 
malicious from benign applications and benign applications from humans. The timing 
feature is an important feature for detecting malicious flows, but a single timing feature is 
not enough to solely detect flows from malicious applications, because it can mislabel 
human flows as malicious, which will result in a high false positive rate.  
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We have already found that the timing-based Model 4’s low detection accuracy 
and precision is mainly caused by mislabeling some human flows as malicious, so the 
single timing pattern is not enough to distinguish flows generated by malicious 
applications or human behaviors. In this situation, we would like to investigate whether 
other features help distinguish between human flows or malicious application flows. 
Which features are particularly helpful? Does a combination of all useful features further 
improve the detection result?  
In our project, the malicious application flows’ detection model is trained based 
on timing pattern and three other features: TCP flag, packet number in each flow, and 
flow duration. We represent feature TCP flag, packet number in each flow, flow duration 
as feature 1, feature 2, feature 3 respectively. To check whether other three features 
(feature1, feature 2, and feature 3) are helpful to distinguish flows generated by human 
behaviors or malicious OSN applications, we train another 4 models with the timing 
feature and another feature: (1) Model 5: trained based on timing and feature 1 to 
distinguish human flows or malicious application flows. (2) Model 6: trained based on 
timing and feature 2 to distinguish human flows or malicious application flows. (3) 
Model 7: trained based on timing and feature 3 to distinguish human flows or malicious 
application flows. (4) Model 8: trained based on timing and feature 1,2,3 to distinguish 
human flows or malicious application flows.  
When distinguishing human flows and malicious application flows by training a 
model only based on timing pattern, the model’s accuracy for detecting human flows is 
75.6% in Model 2. If we train the model with timing and one of the other three features, 
the detection accuracy for human flows can be improved, as is shown in Table 6. If 
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feature 2 is added with the timing pattern to train Model 6, the accuracy of labeling 
human flows can be increased to an accuracy of 92.4%. If feature 1 is added to Model 5, 
the accuracy will increase to 82.8%. Feature 3 is the least useful feature, as it can only 
help improve accuracy to 79.9% in Model 7. Model 8 is trained based on timing pattern 
and all the other three features. This four-feature based Model 8 can detect the human 
flow detection with an accuracy as high as 99.8%. This result indicates that all the other 
three features can help distinguish human flows from malicious application flows 
independently.  
Table 6. Detection accuracy result for different flows in different feature based models 
 Human flow 
detection accuracy 
Malicious application 
detection accuracy 
Model 5: timing + feature 1 82.8% 99.5% 
Model 6: timing + feature 2 92.4% 99.4% 
Model 7: timing + feature 3 79.9% 99.1% 
Model 8: timing + feature 1,2,3 99.8% 100.0% 
 
A combination of the three other features improves accuracy for distinguishing 
human flows and malicious applications, with the best detection accuracy for human 
flows.  
Based on the above analysis, when Model 2 is trained under the presence of only 
malicious and benign application flows, it can’t achieve good performance when it’s only 
trained on a single timing pattern. If we train it with timing and all other three features in 
Model 8, the detection performance is very good.  
We also train a model with timing and three other features to distinguish flows 
between malicious or benign applications in Model 9 in Table 7, where we observe that 
Model 9’s detection performance is also very good. Model 10 is trained by timing and the 
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other three features to distinguish human flows and benign application flows, resulting in 
very good detection performance.  
Table 7. Detection accuracy result for different in each four-feature based model 
 Malicious application 
detection accuracy 
Benign application 
detection accuracy 
Human behavior 
detection accuracy 
Model 8 99.8% - 100.0% 
Model 9 97.9% 96.6% - 
Model 10 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Model 11 97.0% 98.8% 99.5% 
 
Therefore, if we train models based on timing and the other three features, the 
detection performance will not hurt for distinguishing between human flows and benign 
applications, and will not hurt for distinguishing between malicious application flows and 
benign applications flows.  
Finally, Model 11 is trained based on timing and the other three features to 
distinguish malicious application flows, benign application flows and human flows. The 
detection performance for all flows in this Model is also very good. Therefore, a timing 
feature is not enough to distinguish all three flows, but timing in addition to the other 
three features are enough.  
B. Can Our Project Only Detect Flows from Malicious OSN Programs That 
Demonstrate A Similar Timing Patterns with Our five Used Malicious Timing 
Patterns?  
We used four features to detect flows from malicious applications in this project: 
flow start time, TCP flag, flow duration, packet number in each flow. As we can see in 
chapter VIII, the timing feature could be an important feature for us to detect flows 
generated by malicious OSN applications. However, to achieve a high detection precision 
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result, the other three features are also helpful. In a more accurate way, this project is to 
identify applications that exhibit both five malicious timing patterns and other flow-level 
malicious features, instead of identifying applications that only exhibit the five malicious 
timing patterns.  
In this project, we have five malicious timing patterns decide when malicious 
OSN applications post/comment with spam content, so our trained model is indeed 
supposed to detect flows from malicious applications showing similar timing patterns 
with our used five malicious timing patterns.  
In order to create an expressive set of malicious timing patterns, we extended the 
findings of paper (CM Zhang, 2011). They present five malicious timing patterns of real-
life spam accounts. These timing patterns are a good basis to describe possible malicious 
timing behaviors, but they are not complete. For example, the paper suggests that posting 
once a minute throughout a day is an example of malicious behavior, but one can also 
further infer that posting twice a minute is also a reasonable example of malicious 
behavior. Therefore, we create an extensive set of possible malicious timing behaviors 
through slight modifications of the timing behaviors presented by this paper. In order to 
extend one of the five malicious timing patterns presented in that paper, we first create a 
model that describes the presented malicious timing pattern, and then we further add 
variances to this model, which creates an extensive set of possible malicious temporal 
patterns.  
In particular, the parameters of our model are each given a range of realistic 
values, and each derived malicious temporal pattern is a specific instance of possible 
parameter values of our model. This process creates a comprehensive set of malicious 
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timing behaviors. Based on this comprehensive set, we trained a CNN to classify future 
flows that exhibit similar timing patterns as malicious. In fact, we found and downloaded 
three malicious spam programs, and for each downloaded program, a specific instance of 
possible parameter values of our model describes its timing pattern. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that our CNN successfully detected the flows generated by these spam programs 
as malicious.  
To summarize, we varied all related parameters to simulate all possible malicious 
timing pattern instances, and our simulated instances can cover a wide variety of timing 
patterns used by real-world malicious programs. If the real world malicious program’s 
behavior timing pattern is covered in our dataset, our trained model can detect this 
malicious application’s generated flows.  
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION  
 
While most social network providers release some APIs for third-party developers 
to integrate OSN services to their own software, these APIs can be misused widely by 
malicious OSN applications, causing security, privacy and liability concerns to OSN 
providers, network service providers (NSPs), and users. This thesis mainly studies how 
NSPs may apply a methodology which first preprocesses network flows and then 
converts useful flow level features to images as input to train a deep learning model to 
detect network flows from malicious API- based OSN applications. The evaluation 
results show that via this methodology, we can detect flows generated by malicious OSN 
applications with 97.6% accuracy and only 1.6% false positive.  
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CHAPTER X 
FUTURE WORK  
 
We have proposed that our project can be used to detect flows generated by 
malicious OSN API-based applications for NSPs. In this chapter, we will discuss how to 
use our work help NSPs detect flows generated by malicious OSN applications in reality.  
To make use of our work in the real world, NSPs should deploy an OSN flow 
collector running continuously at its border router, where all incoming and outgoing 
traffic can be caught in this network. This process should not require that much effort, 
because flow data only aggregates packet head information, and the flow data size is 
much smaller than the total packets’ size. If a flow caught by the NSP has a source IP 
address or destination IP address belonging to an OSN, then this flow is generated by a 
connection between a machine inside the NSP and an OSN. There are real time online 
router tables that can provide IP blocks for an OSN by sending requests to BGPstream (O 
Chiara, 2016), so the NSP can decide whether a flow’s source or destination address 
belongs to an OSN through IP prefix matching. In this way, NSPs can obtain all traffic 
flows generated between machines inside its network and an OSN.  
The flow data are aggregated packet headers. When NSPs collect all OSN flows 
for each machine (associated with an IP) inside the network, NSPs can use our proposed 
method to detect whether flows generated between an IP and OSN servers are malicious. 
If flows are detected as malicious, it indicates that the machine with this IP is running 
malicious OSN applications. In response, the NSP can decide to block the bad traffic, 
block this compromised IP, or just not do anything.  
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To use our proposed method to train a deep learning model for detecting 
malicious flows, NSPs need to obtain the ground truth by labeling malicious OSN 
application flows, benign OSN application flows and human OSN flows for a particular 
OSN, then train the malicious flow detection model based on the ground truth for this 
OSN. Future work may further include automating the training of this model.  
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